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THE SECTION 203 WAIVER - A NEW DELAWARE HAZARD?
PAT VLAHAKIS*
In an opinion issued late in 2000, the Delaware Court of Chancery found
that interested directors on the Board of a subsidiary, Digex, had breached
their fiduciary duties to minority public stockholders when they forced a
waiver of Section 203 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, to permit
the acquisition of Intermedia, the subsidiary's parent, by WorldCom.' The
Court declined to enjoin WorldCom's acquisition of Intermedia, but left
open the possibility of monetary damages. The Court also declined to decide
whether WorldCom would be subject to the three-year prohibition on
transactions with Digex under Section 203.
The decision is not surprising in one respect because it involves one of
those rare instances where the existence of conflicting interests between a
parent and its controlled subsidiary is obvious, and a special committee of
disinterested directors of the subsidiary is formed; but when the special
committee does not approve what the majority holder wants, the interested
directors overrule the special committee. Courts do not look favorably on
such cases. In the Court's words: [T]he defendants' choice becomes
whether they will proceed with a WorldCom-Intermedia merger knowing
that this Court seriously questions the integrity of the Section 203 waiver
decision, and knowing that certain of the defendant[s'] fiduciaries stand
accused of faithless acts that under the stringent standard of the entire
fairness test, could well give rise to a range of equitable remedies, including
monetary remedies.2
The Digex decision is noteworthy in at least two respects. First, it
involves a lengthy discussion, without a determination, on the necessity of
a Section 203 waiver by a partially public subsidiary, in a situation involving
the acquisition of the parent's shares. In the wake of the once-hot IPO
market, many publicly traded companies today find themselves with publicly
traded subsidiaries. The Digex decision highlights the hazards of dealing
with Section 203 in that context. Second, the Court's view is that where
there is leverage, there is a duty to use the leverage. Moreover, the Court
clearly reserves the right to review the way in which the leverage is used. In
light of the conflicts of interest present in the Digex case, the Court reviewed
the Board's decision of whether to grant the Section 203 waiver under the
entire fairness standard. It remains to be seen whether enhanced scrutiny of
Partner; Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz.
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Section 203 waivers in other contexts will ensue, and what impact it will
have.
The difficulties faced by Intermedia in the Digex case were, in many
respects, of Intermedia's own making. Intermedia initially undertook a sale
of Digex, a company in which it had a 92% voting interest, a 52% equity
interest, and a majority of the Board. Public stockholders held the remainder
of the Digex equity. A special committee of the Digex Board, composed of
directors not appointed by Intermedia, was established to review potential
transactions involving Digex. While the special committee focus had been
on acquisition of Digex, WorldCom changed its bid at the last minute and
sought to acquire Intermedia instead, without acquiring the publicly traded
stock of Digex. Because WorldCom might be viewed as an interested
stockholder of Digex after its acquisition of Intermedia, WorldCom
requested a waiver by the Digex Board under Section 203, although the
special committee was given no role in negotiating the waiver. In the end,
the interested Digex directors overruled a vote by the members of the special
committee against granting the Section 203 waiver. The fact that the process
started as a sale of Digex, and ended as a sale of Intermedia gave rise to a
claim that Intermedia had usurped a control premium properly payable to the
Digex stockholders. While the Court ruled that Intermedia had not
misappropriated a corporate opportunity belongingto Digex, the flavor ofthe
case might have been far different if the sale of Intermedia had been the only
transaction ever contemplated.
The narrow issue that the Court examined at length, but ultimately
declined to decide in Digex, was whether the so-called 85% exemption to the
Delaware business combination statute was meant to apply where an
interested stockholder owns more than 85% of the voting power, but less
than 85% of the outstanding shares, of a company's common stock. Under
the exemption, if an interested stockholder acquires more than 85% of the
outstanding voting stock at the time, it becomes an interested stockholder;
the three-year prohibition on mergers and similar transactions under Section
203 does not apply. The question regarding the 85% exemption arose
because upon its acquisition of Intermedia, absent a waiver or an exemption
under Section 203,WorldCom would have become an interested stockholder
of Digex. While WorldCom believed, and argued to the Court, that the 85%
exemption applied, at the time the transaction was negotiated, counsel could
not opine definitively to that effect. As a result, WorldCom requested a
waiver by Digex under Section 203. The Court's examination of the
legislative history of Section 203 reveals a persuasive case that the exemption
was intended to require ownership of at least 85% of the shares, not just 85%
of the votes. The Court, however, found the issue unripe for decision.
Instead, the Court found that the Section 203 waiver, which had been
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granted over the objection of Digex's disinterested directors, was a breach of
fiduciary duty.
The issue under Section 203 not decided by the Court is most relevant
for a narrow group of companies: those with classes of common stock
having different voting rights. The case does, however, highlight one
anomaly of the Delaware business combination statute - not surprisingly that Section 203 operates on a concept of beneficial ownership. Acquisitions
of a parent are, secondarily, acquisitions of subsidiaries. In a world where
publicly traded companies have wholly-owned subsidiaries, there is no issue.
During the past few years, however, many public companies have sought to
unlock the value of subsidiaries by causing them to go public. A common
structure is that the subsidiary offers up to 19.9% of its shares, and the parent
retains 80.1% in order to be able to continue to consolidate for tax purposes.
Under such a structure, an acquirer of the parent would never be eligible for
the 85% exemption under Section 203 with respect to the subsidiary. As the
Court in Digex noted, the subsidiary could opt out of Section 203 before
going public. Many such subsidiaries have not done so, however, in
anticipation of being completely publicly traded at some point down the
road.
Unlike the circumstances in Digex, where a potential sale of a subsidiary
evolved into a sale of the parent, the more common scenario would be of an
acquirer seeking - from the outset - to acquire a publicly traded parent. The
acquirer could well be happy that the parent company has, as an asset, an
80.1% interest in a publicly traded company. The subsidiary could, however,
be a small part of its parent, and might not be the driving force of the
acquirer's interest in the parent company. Moreover, while the acquirer
could have no present intention to affect the subsidiary, the acquirer could
nonetheless seek to condition its deal on obtaining a Section 203 waiver from
the subsidiary's Board, in order to preserve its ability to engage in the future
in the types of transactions that otherwise would be prohibited under Section
203. The question under these facts is why the subsidiary's Board should
have a say in the acquisition of parent. An acquisition of the subsidiary was
never contemplated. Any control premium being paid to parent stockholders
under these facts is attributable to control of parent, not the de minimus
subsidiary. In effect, the only consequence of the Section 203 waiver under
these facts is to give a subsidiary Board a potential veto over a transaction
relating to its parent. Under these facts, the only jeopardy to the public
stockholders of the subsidiary is the potential abuse of power by the new
controlling stockholder in ways that were available to the former controlling
stockholder, but not used.
Under the Digex decision, it would appear that the Board of a controlled
subsidiary must always attempt to secure a benefit for the corporation and its
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stockholders when granting a Section 203 waiver with respect to an acquirer
of its parent. The same logic would require that the Board of any company
in which a controlling block is being sold, must similarly seek to negotiate a
benefit where the block is being sold, but the remaining shares are not. One
question in each of these cases is what the Board should request. The Court
applied the entire fairness test, part of which is to evaluate whether the
benefit received by the corporation was a fair price for the waiver. The
question is how a court or a Board can really evaluate the value of the benefit
received. The Digex Board asked for, and received, a charter amendment
limiting the ability of the new controlling stockholder to engage in
transactions with Digex absent independent director approval. At least under
the circumstances posed above, that would appear to be more than reasonable
protection. Yet the very broad language of the Digex decision suggests that
perhaps the subsidiary Board should have sought more:
The waiver appears to have been agreed to, in part, in exchange for
an amendment to the Digex certificate of incorporation that would
require the approval of independent directors of any material
transaction between WorlCom and Digex after the merger. The
record is silent as to exploration by the interested parties of any other
options available to Digex. That is, as it appears that WorldCom
insisted on the waiver, did any of the interested directors attempt to
withhold this request in order to see what WorldCom might offer to
Digex in return? Or, did the directors request concessions in
addition to the certificate amendment that might benefit Digex or
3
Intermedia?
Clearly, the fact, which most troubled the Court, was that the disinterested
directors did not participate in the negotiation with WorldCom and were, in
the end, overruled by the interested directors. The process undercut any
claim that WorldCom would not have agreed to further concessions: "Was
this the best deal available? Because of the manner in which the negotiating
process was handled, it is impossible to say. Perhaps Digex could have
extracted something more from WorldCom, perhaps not."4
Perhaps if the Digex special committee had approved the waiver after due
consideration of the benefits to Digex, the Court would have been satisfied.
Yet, the Court's insistence on the use of leverage where leverage exists
suggests that whenever a company is asked to grant a Section 203 waiver with
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respect to a control block, it must at least go through the steps of requesting
something in exchange, even if the acquirer never proposed to buy the
remaining shares. Maintaining the status quo, in terms of protecting the
public stockholders with an amendment to the certificate, may not suffice.
A further question that arises out of the Digex decision is what standard
of review will be used when a Board grants a Section 203 waiver in contexts
other than that of a controlled subsidiary. There are a number of very
common cases where a stockholder seeks to sell its shares and, in that
connection, seeks a Section 203 waiver from the Board. For example, a
holder of 20% of a company's shares, who seeks to sell those shares in a
transaction not otherwise involving a change of control of the company, may
wish to deliver those shares to the buyer free ofthe three-year prohibition on
transactions under Section 203. What standard of review applies to the
Board's decision in this context? Absent a controlling stockholder, or a sale
of control transaction, one would think the ordinary businessjudgment rule
should apply. Yet, the Board has leverage. Under the theory of the Digex
case, should the Board seek something in exchange for the waiver? If so, the
question is what? The Board could seek to condition its waiver on the
buyer's not acquiring additional shares without a further waiver under
Section 203. This limitation might not, however, be acceptable to the buyer.
It is difficult to envision what other benefit the corporation could seek, since
it is unlikely, in this case, that the seller would be receiving a control
premium, or other benefit, that the remaining shareholders could seek to
share.
Another common circumstance in which a Section 203 waiver is sought
is where there is a proposed merger and one of the parties has a significant
stockholder. The other party typically seeks a lockup agreement from the
stockholder. The stockholder either grants an option on its shares, or agrees
to tender the shares, or to vote them in favor of the merger. Depending
upon what rights the acquirer obtains in the lockup, the acquirer may be
deemed to beneficially own those shares for purposes of Section 203,
necessitating a waiver. The Section 203 waiver is separate from the waiver
needed for the acquirer to consummate the merger. Assuming for the
moment that the merger constitutes a sale of control, the Board's decisions
in approving the merger, including decisions with respect to lockups and the
like, would be reviewed under the Revlon standard, which obligates the Board
to maximize value for all stockholders.'
Does this mean the Board is obligated to seek something separate in
exchange for the Section 203 waiver with respect to the lockup? Presumably

s
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the benefit of the overall transaction to the stockholders could justify the
granting of a Section 203 waiver for a lockup on which the acquirer has
conditioned its bid. Does the Board, however, have to condition the waiver
on its continued approval of the transaction? Put differently, if the Board
negotiates a right to terminate the merger agreement in favor of a superior
transaction, should it condition its Section 203 waiver with respect to the
lockup on the merger agreement remaining in effect?
If the concept of the duty to use leverage from Digex is imported into the
context of a sale of control to which Revlon duties apply, the question is how
a Court will review a Board's decision to grant a Section 203 waiver for a
lockup on a stockholder's shares. The decision in Ace Ltd. v. Capital Re
Corp.,6 suggests that the Board could well have to retain a string on the
waiver, even in a case where Revlon duties do not apply. In Ace, Cap Re and
Ace had agreed to a stock-for-stock merger. Nearly 46% of the Cap Re
shares were committed in favor of the Ace deal. Ace sued Cap Re to prevent
it from exercising a right to meet with XL, a competing bidder. The case
focused on language in the contract that enabled the Cap Re Board to meet
with a competing bidder, if required to avoid a breach of fiduciary duty.
Instead of simply finding that the language of the merger agreement gave
Cap Re a right to meet with the competing bidder and to terminate in favor
of a better deal, the Court launched into some rather startling dicta
concerning whether, even absent Revlon duties, a Board can contract away its
right to terminate in favor of a better deal: "The fact that that board has no
Revlon duties does not mean that it can contractually bind itself to sit idly by
and allow an unfavorable and preclusive transaction to occur that its own
actions have brought about."7 Further, "it is especially important that the
board negotiate with care and retain sufficient flexibility to ensure that the
stockholders are not unfairly coerced into accepting a less than optional
exchange for their shares."'
Clearly theAce Court was troubled by the thought that the Cap Re Board
might not have reserved the right to terminate the merger agreement in a
situation where 46% of the stock was committed to vote for the merger,
absent such a termination. The same concern would appear to apply to the
grant of a Section 203 waiver with respect to a lockup arrangement with a
significant stockholder. Under the Ace Court's view, a Board may need to
seek to limit a Section 203 waiver for a lockup to the situation where the
Board continues to recommend the merger. Otherwise, depending upon the
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amount of stock locked up, the initial bidder could use the lockup to force
a transaction on other stockholders in the face of a competing bid.
The implication of the Digex notion of a duty to use leverage, and the Ace
precaution that a Board negotiate with caution and retain sufficient flexibility
to secure the best transaction for stockholders, is that courts will closely
review Section 203 waivers in all contexts, whether or not a sale of control
is occurring, and that the standard of review may not be as clear as
practitioners would desire. The Section 203 leverage - a creature of statute
- may prove to be a newly hazardous tool for Boards of Delaware
corporations.

